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Police Questioning in the Charter
Era: Adjudicative versus Regulatory
Rule-making and the Problem of
False Confessions
Steven Penney
I. INTRODUCTION
Perhaps no aspect of Charter1-era criminal procedure jurisprudence
has come under more vociferous attack than the courts’ use of the
common law to create new powers for police. Over the past 30 years, the
“ancillary powers” doctrine has filled gaps in the legislative armoury of
investigative powers, mostly in the areas of detention and arrest (hereinafter “detention”) and search and seizure (hereinafter “search”).2 The
chief message of the doctrine’s critics is that courts should stick to the
job that they are institutionally best suited to: protecting individual rights
by ensuring that legislation and legislatively sanctioned executive action
conforms to the minimum standards set out in the Charter.3
There is one area of constitutional criminal procedure, however, that
has remained untouched by both the ancillary powers doctrine and
(necessarily) its critics: police questioning. The reason for this is that


Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Alberta. Thanks to Evan McIntyre and Nicholas
Trofimuk for excellent research assistance.
1
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
2
See, generally, Steven Penney, Vincenzo Rondinelli & James Stribopoulos, Criminal
Procedure in Canada (Markham, ON: LexisNexis, 2011), at paras. 1.216-1.227 [hereinafter
“Penney, Rondinelli & Stribopoulos”].
3
See R. v. Kang-Brown, [2008] S.C.J. No. 18, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 456, at paras. 2-17 (S.C.C.),
LeBel J., dissenting; James Stribopoulos, “In Search of Dialogue: The Supreme Court, Police
Powers and the Charter” (2005) 31 Queen’s L.J. 1, at 18-30, 55-61 [hereinafter “Stribopoulos, ‘In
Search of Dialogue’”]; James Stribopoulos, “The Limits of Judicially Created Police Powers:
Investigative Detention After Mann” (2007) 52 Crim. L.Q. 299, at 314-24 [hereinafter “Stribopoulos, ‘Limits’”]; Glen Luther, “Police Power and The Charter of Rights and Freedoms: Creation or
Control” (1986) 51 Sask. L. Rev. 117, at 222-27; Tim Quigley, “Brief Investigatory Detentions: A
Critique of R. v. Simpson” (2004) 41 Alta. L. Rev. 935, at 949-50.
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neither Parliament nor the courts have given police a “power” to question. Instead, they have merely a “freedom” to do so; people approached
or detained by police are accordingly entitled to choose whether and how
to answer.4 In this, the law of police questioning differs from that of
detention and search, where (subject to limitations) police are empowered to compel cooperation, either through physical force5 or legal
sanction.6
This does not mean, of course, that there is no need to regulate police
questioning. Using their physical and psychological advantages over
criminal suspects, police sometimes question them in undesirable ways,
including those that are inherently cruel, compel unfair self-incrimination
or induce false confessions.7 The law therefore limits the ways in which
police are permitted to persuade suspects to speak to them.
The same issue raised in the ancillary powers debate — the merits
and demerits of legislative versus judicial rule-making — is thus potentially in play for police questioning. As with detention and search, there
could be a vigorous conversation on the proper functions of the common
law, ordinary legislation, and the Charter in regulating police questioning. However, one of the parties to that conversation — Parliament —
has been almost entirely silent. With the exception of the questioning of
young persons,8 Parliament has declined to legislate on the topic, leaving
the courts as the sole regulators of police questioning practices.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the implications of this legislative absence. The first question addressed is whether the critics of the
ancillary powers doctrine are correct that the optimal regulation of police
investigative practices requires robust legislative input. I argue that they
are. Second, I ask whether courts could effectively compel Parliament to
regulate police questioning. I argue that this is improbable. Lastly, I
4

See, generally, Ed Ratushny, Self-incrimination in the Canadian Criminal Process (Toronto: Carswell, 1979), at 185-86 [hereinafter “Ratushny”]; R. v. Singh, [2007] S.C.J. No. 48, [2007]
3 S.C.R. 405, at paras. 27-28 (S.C.C.); R. v. Turcotte, [2005] S.C.J. No. 51, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 519, at
para. 41 (S.C.C.); R. v. Rothman, [1981] S.C.J. No. 55, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 640, at 683 (S.C.C.).
5
See, e.g., Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 25; R. v. Asante-Mensah, [2003] S.C.J.
No. 38, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.).
6
See, e.g., Criminal Code, s. 254(5); Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 198, s. 189(1);
Traffic Safety Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. T-6, s. 166.
7
See, generally, Christopher Sherrin, “False Confessions and Admissions in Canadian
Law” (2005) 30 Queen’s L.J. 601 [hereinafter “Sherrin”]; Steven Penney, “What’s Wrong with SelfIncrimination? The Wayward Path of Self-Incrimination Law in the Post-Charter Era, Part 2: SelfIncrimination in Police Investigations” (2004) 48 Crim. L.Q. 280 [hereinafter “Penney, ‘What’s
Wrong?’”]; Timothy E. Moore & C. Lindsay Fitzsimmons, “Justice Imperiled: False Confessions
and the Reid Technique” (2011) 57 Crim. L.Q. 509 [hereinafter “Moore & Fitzsimmons”].
8
Youth Criminal Justice Act, S.C. 2002, c. 1, s. 146(1).
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explore whether appellate courts should compensate for legislative
silence by adopting a more robustly “regulatory” (as opposed to “adjudicative”) approach to decision-making. I argue that they should and
provide examples (under the common law confessions rule and section
10(b) of the Charter) of how such an approach could better address the
chief policy issue raised by police questioning: false confessions.

II. PARLIAMENT’S ROLE IN REGULATING INVESTIGATIVE
METHODS: WHAT HAS IT BEEN?
Before discussing the optimal relationship between Parliament and
the courts in regulating investigative powers, it will be helpful to briefly
describe the history of that relationship. Before the enactment of the
Charter in 1982, neither Parliament nor the courts were active in the
field.9 Section 91(27) of the Constitution Act, 186710 gives Parliament
exclusive authority over matters of “Criminal Procedure”, which includes the investigative phase of the criminal process. Parliament has
never enacted a comprehensive code of criminal procedure, however, and
its footprint on the investigative phase is small.11
This was especially true in the pre-Charter era. During that period,
Parliament codified common law arrest powers,12 created several search
powers,13 regulated the questioning of young persons,14 and enacted a
9
As a law school subject and field of practice, pre-Charter “criminal procedure” consisted
largely of the law relating to the post-investigative phases of the criminal process. A glance at the
leading contemporary texts reveals there was little law regulating the investigative phase. See, e.g.,
Roger E. Salhany, Canadian Criminal Procedure, 3d ed. (Toronto: Canada Law Book, 1978)
(1 chapter of 10); Eugene G. Ewaschuk, Criminal Pleadings and Practice in Canada (Toronto:
Canada Law Book, 1983) (3 chapters of 25).
10
30 & 31 Vict., c. 3 (U.K.).
11
Provincial legislatures have also given police investigative powers under various provincial heads of power that may be used in criminal inquiries in some circumstances. See, generally, R.
v. Nolet, [2010] S.C.J. No. 24, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 851 (S.C.C.); R. v. Orbanski; R. v. Elias, [2005]
S.C.J. No. 37, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.); Brown v. Durham Regional Police Force, [1998] O.J. No.
5274, 43 O.R. (3d) 223 (Ont. C.A.). The same is true of investigative powers enacted under federal
regulatory legislation (i.e., legislation enacted under federal heads of power other than s. 91(27) of
the Constitution Act, 1867, id. See generally R. v. Jarvis, [2002] S.C.J. No. 76, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 757
(S.C.C.).
12
Criminal Code, 1892 (U.K.), 55 & 56 Vict., c. 29, s. 552 (see now Criminal Code, R.S.C.
1985, c. C-46, s. 495).
13
See, e.g., Criminal Code, 1892, id., s. 569 (search warrants for “building, receptacle or
place”) (see now Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 487); Opium and Drug Act, S.C. 1911,
c. 17, s. 7 (search powers in relation to drugs) (see now Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, S.C.
1996, c. 19, s. 11); Protection of Privacy Act, S.C. 1973-74, c. 50 (wiretap authorizations) (see now
Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, Part VI).
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Bill of Rights15 granting individuals certain rights in relation to detention,
search and questioning. The effect of these laws in regulating police was
limited, however. The reasons for this are well known. First, many of the
rules were defined by Parliament16 or interpreted by the courts17 to
maintain maximal police discretion. Second, people affected by rule
violations rarely had access to effective remedies.18 With few exceptions,19 there were no statutory powers to exclude illegally obtained
evidence, and the Supreme Court of Canada was virtually alone in the
common law world in refusing to recognize a common law discretion to
exclude illegally obtained evidence.20 In addition, while the principle of
legality held police accountable for misconduct amounting to a tort or
crime, lawsuits and criminal prosecutions were rare.21
The courts did little to fill the gaps. They had recognized a common
law police power to search incident to arrest.22 And in a case arising
shortly before the Charter, the Supreme Court of Canada recognized a
new common law power to detain motorists to investigate impaired

14
Young Offenders Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. Y-1, s. 56; see now Youth Criminal Justice Act,
S.C. 2002, c. 1, s. 146.
15
Canadian Bill of Rights, S.C. 1960, c. 44, R.S.C. 1985, App. III [hereinafter “Bill of
Rights”].
16
See, e.g., Narcotic Control Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. N-1, s. 10 (warrantless searches for drugs
and searches for drugs under writs of assistance). See also R. v. Grant, [1993] S.C.J. No. 98, [1993]
3 S.C.R. 223 (S.C.C.) (warrantless searches under s. 10 of Narcotic Control Act violate s. 8 of
Charter absent exigent circumstances); R. v. Sieben, [1987] S.C.J. No. 11, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 295
(S.C.C.) (assuming that writs of assistance violate s. 8 of the Charter).
17
See, e.g., R. v. Chromiak, [1979] S.C.J. No. 116, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 471 (S.C.C.) (right to
counsel triggered by “detention”, which consists only of actual physical restraint). See, generally,
Walter Surma Tarnopolsky, The Canadian Bill of Rights, 2d ed. (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart,
1975).
18
See R. v. Hogan, [1974] S.C.J. No. 116, [1975] 2 S.C.R. 574, at 584 (S.C.C.) (no exclusion of evidence for violations of Bill of Rights).
19
See, e.g., Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, s. 178.16(1) (exclusion of illegally
obtained wiretap evidence).
20
See Quebec (Attorney General) v. Begin, [1955] S.C.J. No. 37, [1955] S.C.R. 593
(S.C.C.); R. v. Wray, [1970] S.C.J. No. 80, [1971] S.C.R. 272, at 293 (S.C.C.). See also Steven
Penney, “Unreal Distinctions: The Exclusion of Unfairly Obtained Evidence Under Section 24(2) of
the Charter” (1994) 32 Alta. L. Rev. 782, at 784-93.
21
See Paul C. Weiler, “The Control of Police Arrest Practices: Reflections of a Tort Lawyer” in Allen M. Linden, ed., Studies in Canadian Tort Law (Toronto: Butterworths, 1968) 416, at
448-49; Andrew Goldsmith, “Necessary But Not Sufficient: The Role of Public Complaints
Procedures in Police Accountability” in Philip C. Stenning, ed., Accountability for Criminal Justice:
Selected Essays (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995) 110, at 124.
22
Until quite recently, however, the contours of this power were vague. See Cloutier v.
Langlois, [1990] S.C.J. No. 10, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 158 (S.C.C.). See also R. v. Stillman, [1997] S.C.J.
No. 34, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 607 (S.C.C.); R. v. Golden, [2001] S.C.J. No. 81, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 679, 159
C.C.C. (3d) 449 (S.C.C.).
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driving offences.23 Lastly, as in other common law jurisdictions, Canadian courts had for many decades indirectly regulated interrogation
practices by excluding involuntary confessions.24
Police therefore had a largely free hand to do their jobs as they saw
fit. Professional and other non-legal norms were undoubtedly influential
in restraining misconduct. Abuses were frequent enough, however, that
advocacy groups pressured the federal government to ensure that the
Charter included robust checks on police discretion.25 These efforts
helped shape the final versions of sections 8, 9 and 10 of the Charter
(which set out the main constitutional rules regulating search, detention
and questioning, respectively) as well as section 24 (which gave courts
the power to award meaningful remedies for constitutional violations,
including the exclusion of evidence).26 Like most other Charter rights,
these provisions were articulated in broad terms.
At the dawn of the Charter era, there were thus three sources of legal
rules regulating police investigations: a patchwork of statutory provisions, a handful of common law rules, and the new constitutional rights
guarantees and remedial provisions. From this mix emerged a new,
constitutionalized criminal procedure that increasingly regulated a
greater and greater proportion of the field, much as in the United States
after the Warren Court’s “due process revolution” in the 1960s.27 And as
in the United States, in Canada the courts were (and remain) the chief
architects of this revolution, interpreting the Charter “purposively” to:
create rules directly regulating police investigations; strike down or
temper statutory police powers; and shape the contours of both established and novel common law police powers.
Parliament’s role in the Charter-era has been mostly secondary, reactive and deferential. It did not use the opportunity of the Charter’s
23

R. v. Dedman, [1985] S.C.J. No. 45, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 2 (S.C.C.).
See R. v. Boudreau, [1949] S.C.J. No. 10, [1949] S.C.R. 262 (S.C.C.), per Rand J.; R. v.
Fitton, [1956] S.C.J. No. 70, [1956] S.C.R. 958 (S.C.C.); R. v. Rothman, [1981] S.C.J. No. 55,
[1981] 1 S.C.R. 640, at 644 (S.C.C.). The rule is most often traced to R. v. Warickshall (1783), 1
Leach. 262, 168 E.R. 234 (K.B.). Its definitive, traditional formulation was set out in Ibrahim v. R.,
[1914] A.C. 599, at 609 (P.C.).
25
See, e.g., Canada, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Special Joint Committee
of the Senate and of the House of Commons on the Constitution of Canada, 1:7 (November 18,
1980), at 11-12, 15-16, 27-29 (Canadian Civil Liberties Association); 1:7, at 89-90, 92 (November
18, 1980) (Canadian Jewish Congress); and 1:15, at 8, 15, 18 (November 28, 1980) (Canadian Bar
Association).
26
See, generally, Anne F. Bayefsky, Canada’s Constitution Act 1982 & Amendments: A
Documentary History, vol. 2 (Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1989), at 771.
27
See Yale Kamisar, “The Warren Court and Criminal Justice: A Quarter-Century Retrospective” (1995) 31 Tulsa L.J. 1, at 2-3.
24
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passage to codify or reform the law regulating criminal investigations. Its
chief involvement has been to give police powers to use investigative
techniques that courts had invalidated under the Charter.28 In the main,
these powers hewed closely to the constitutional limits dictated by the
courts.29 In short, if the relationship between Parliament and the courts in
this field can be characterized as a constitutional “dialogue”,30 it is one
dominated by the latter party.
Nor did Parliament take up the opportunity to engage the courts in a
non-constitutional dialogue about police powers. As mentioned, the
courts had occasionally recognized common law police powers before
the Charter. This happened only rarely, however, and in the early years of
the Charter the Supreme Court of Canada questioned the legitimacy of
the practice.31 That reluctance began to fade with the widespread recog28

See, e.g., An Act to amend the Criminal Code, the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act
and the Radiocommunication Act, S.C. 1993, c. 40, s. 4 (see now Criminal Code, ss. 184.1-184.2
(responding to R. v. Duarte, [1990] S.C.J. No. 2, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 30 (S.C.C.) and R. v. Wiggins,
[1990] S.C.J. No. 3, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 62 (S.C.C.)); An Act to amend the Criminal Code, the Crown
Liability and Proceedings Act and the Radiocommunication Act, S.C. 1993, c. 40, s. 15 (see now
Criminal Code, s. 487.01 (responding to R. v. Wong, [1990] S.C.J. No. 118, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 36
(S.C.C.)); An Act to amend the Criminal Code, the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act and the
Radiocommunication Act, S.C. 1993, c. 40, s. 18 (see now Criminal Code, s. 492.1 (responding to R.
v. Wise, [1992] S.C.J. No. 16, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 527 (S.C.C.)); An Act to Amend the Criminal Code
(organized crime and protection of justice system participants), S.C. 1997, c. 23, s. 14 (see now
Criminal Code, s. 487.3 (responding to R. v. Feeney, [1997] S.C.J. No. 49, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 13
(S.C.C.)); An Act to amend the Criminal Code and the Young Offenders Act (forensic DNA analysis),
S.C. 1995, c. 27, s. 1 (see now Criminal Code, ss. 487.04-.05 (responding to R. v. Borden, [1994]
S.C.J. No. 82, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 145 (S.C.C.)); DNA Identification Act, S.C. 1998, c. 37 (see now
Criminal Code, s. 487.091 (responding to R. v. Stillman, supra, note 22); Criminal Law Improvement Act, 1996, S.C. 1997, c. 18, s. 46 (see now Criminal Code, s. 487.11 (responding to R. v.
Grant, supra, note 16 and R. v. Silveira, [1992] S.C.J. No. 38, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 297 (S.C.C.)).
Parliament did act independently in creating new search powers in specialized contexts. See,
e.g., An Act to Amend the Criminal Code (capital markets fraud and evidence-gathering), S.C. 2004,
c. 3, s. 7 (see now Criminal Code, ss. 487.011-487.017 (general production orders and production
orders for financial information)); An Act to amend the Criminal Code, the Crown Liability and
Proceedings Act and the Radiocommunication Act, S.C. 1993, c. 40, s. 18 (see now Criminal Code,
s. 492.2 (number recorder warrants)); An Act to amend the Criminal Code, the Food and Drugs Act
and the Narcotic Control Act, S.C. 1988, c. 51 (see now s. 462.32 (warrants for proceeds of crime)).
29
See Stribopoulos, “In Search of Dialogue”, supra, note 3, at 66-73; Kent Roach, The
Supreme Court on Trial: Judicial Activism or Democratic Dialogue (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2001), at
176-79 [hereinafter “Roach, Supreme Court”].
30
See, generally, Peter W. Hogg & Allison A. Bushell, “The Charter Dialogue Between
Courts and Legislatures (Or Perhaps the Charter of Rights Isn’t Such a Bad Thing After All)” (1997)
35 Osgoode Hall L.J. 75; Roach, Supreme Court, id.; Stribopoulos, “In Search of Dialogue”, id., at
61-73.
31
See, e.g., R. v. Wong, supra, note 28, at 56 (“it does not sit well for the courts, as the
protectors of our fundamental rights, to widen the possibility of encroachments on these personal
liberties. It falls to Parliament to make incursions on fundamental rights if it is of the view that they
are needed for the protection of the public in a properly balanced system of criminal justice”.).
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nition by provincial courts of appeal of the common law power of
investigative detention.32 That power was finally confirmed by the
Supreme Court in 2004,33 and within a few years the Court had recognized a suite of common law detention and search powers.34 Without
exception, Parliament chose to leave these powers alone.

III. PARLIAMENT’S ROLE IN REGULATING INVESTIGATIVE
METHODS: WHAT SHOULD IT BE?
The next question is whether Parliament should be playing a more
active role in regulating criminal investigations. There are at least three
arguments in favour of greater legislative input. First, compared to
courts, legislatures are more directly responsive to people’s preferences
for alternative policy choices. There are of course downsides to preference aggregation,35 and public choice theory teaches that the outcomes of
the democratic process are often skewed in favour of motivated and
powerful coalitions.36 But these flaws may be offset (to some degree at
least) by the courts’ counter-majoritarian role in constitutional rights
protection.37
32
See R. v. Simpson, [1993] O.J. No. 308, 79 C.C.C. (3d) 482 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Ferris,
[1998] B.C.J. No. 1415, 126 C.C.C. (3d) 298 (B.C.C.A.), leave to appeal refused [1998] S.C.C.A.
No. 424 (S.C.C.); R. v. Dupuis, [1994] A.J. No. 1011, 162 A.R. 197 (Alta. C.A.); R. v. Lake, [1996]
S.J. No. 886, 113 C.C.C. (3d) 208 (Sask. C.A.); R. v. G. (C.M.), [1996] M.J. No. 428, 113 Man. R.
(2d) 76 (Man. C.A.); R. c. Pigeon, [1993] J.Q. no 1683, 59 Q.A.C. 103 (Que. C.A.); R. v. Carson,
[1998] N.B.J. No. 482, 39 M.V.R. (3d) 55 (N.B.C.A.); R. v. Chabot, [1993] N.S.J. No. 465, 86
C.C.C. (3d) 309 (N.S.C.A.); R. v. Burke, [1997] N.J. No. 187, 118 C.C.C. (3d) 59 (Nfld. C.A.).
33
R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 59 (S.C.C.).
34
See R. v. Godoy, [1998] S.C.J. No. 85, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 311 (S.C.C.) (emergency search
power); R. v. Clayton, [2007] S.C.J. No. 32, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 725 (S.C.C.) (investigative roadblock);
R. v. Kang-Brown, supra, note 3 (canine sniff search); R. v. M. (A.), [2008] S.C.J. No. 19, [2008] 1
S.C.R. 569 (S.C.C.) (same).
35
It is often suggested, for example, that legislators and their constituents are almost always
hostile to the interests of criminal suspects and defendants. See Anthony G. Amsterdam, “Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment” (1974) 58 Minn. L. Rev. 349, at 378-79; Kent Roach, Due Process
and Victims’ Rights: The New Law and Politics of Criminal Justice (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 1999); William J. Stuntz, “The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law” (2001) 100 Mich. L.
Rev. 505, at 553-56; Donald A. Dripps, “Criminal Procedure, Footnote Four, and the Theory of
Public Choice; or, Why Don’t Legislatures Give a Damn About the Rights of the Accused?” (1993)
44 Syracuse L. Rev. 1079; Don Stuart, “Time to Recodify Criminal Law and Rise Above Law and
Order Expediency: Lessons from the Manitoba Warriors Prosecution” (2000) 28 Man. L.J. 89.
36
See Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Law and Public Choice: A Critical Introduction (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991); Maxwell L. Stearns, ed., Public Choice and
Public Law: Readings and Commentary (Cincinnati: Anderson, 1997); William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
“Dynamic Statutory Interpretation” (1987) 135 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1479, at 1530.
37
See John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1980); Rosalind Dixon, “The Supreme Court of Canada, Charter Dialogue,
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Second, legislatures are better placed than courts to amass the information necessary for optimal, prospective regulation of complex systems.38 Courts, by contrast, lack specialized expertise in the subject
matter, are limited in their ability to call upon relevant social science and
other “social facts”,39 and can only regulate in a piecemeal fashion in
response to the cases that come before them.40
Third, while legislators and judges undoubtedly suffer from the same
cognitive biases afflicting everyone,41 the retrospective and case-specific
nature of adjudication heightens the distorting effects of hindsight bias.42
Courts encounter only a tiny proportion of the population of innocent
people harmed by investigative intrusions. Thankfully, such persons are
rarely charged and even more rarely tried. And as mentioned, few seek
redress for this harm in civil court. As a consequence, the overwhelming
majority of criminal defendants harmed by police are factually guilty.
Hindsight bias inclines courts to conclude that these harms were justified
in the circumstances.43 This leads courts to articulate flexible rules
and Deference” (2009) 47 Osgoode Hall L.J. 235, at 257-66; Thomas W. Merrill, “Does Public
Choice Theory Justify Judicial Activism After All?” (1997) 21 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 219; Frank
B. Cross, “Institutions and Enforcement of the Bill of Rights” (2000) 85 Cornell L. Rev. 1529;
Michael C. Dorf & Michael Isaacharff, “Can Process Theory Constrain Courts?” (2001) 72 U. Colo.
L. Rev. 923; Michael J. Klarman, “The Puzzling Resistance to Political Process Theory” (1991) 77
Va. L. Rev. 747, at 763-68.
38
See Adrian Vermeule, Law and the Limits of Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2008); Neil K. Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives: Choosing Institutions in Law, Economics, and
Public Policy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994); R. v. Landry, [1986] S.C.J. No. 10,
[1986] 1 S.C.R. 145, at 187-88 (S.C.C.), La Forest J., dissenting; R. v. Evans, [1996] S.C.J. No. 1,
[1996] 1 S.C.R. 8, at para. 4 (S.C.C.), La Forest J., concurring.
39
See Stephen Breyer, “Our Democratic Constitution” (2002) 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 245, at
261-63; Orin S. Kerr, “The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and
the Case for Caution” (2004) 102 Mich. L. Rev. 801, at 875-76 [hereinafter “Kerr, ‘Fourth
Amendment’”]; Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, “Interpretations and Institutions” (2003) 101
Mich. L. Rev. 885, at 903-904, 923 [hereinafter “Sunstein & Vermeule”]; William J. Stuntz,
Accountable Policing (Harvard Public Law Working Paper No. 130, 2006), available online:
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=886170>.
40
See Stuart Minor Benjamin, “Stepping Into the Same River Twice: Rapidly Changing
Facts and the Appellate Process” (1999) 78 Tex. L. Rev. 269.
41
Like other decision-makers (including judges), the rationality of legislators (and the
people who elect them) is limited by many factors, including incomplete and asymmetric information, bounded rationality and systemic psychological distortions. See, generally, Cass R. Sunstein,
ed., Behavioral Law and Economics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) [hereinafter
“Sunstein, Behavioral Law”].
42
See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, “A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight” in
Sunstein, Behavioral Law, id., 95.
43
See Stribopoulos, “In Search of Dialogue”, supra, note 3, at 57-58; Carol S. Steiker,
“Second Thoughts About First Principles” (1994) 107 Harv. L. Rev. 820, at 852-53; Brent Snook et
al., “Reforming Investigative Interviewing in Canada” (2010) 52 Can. J. Criminology & Crim. Just.
203, at 206 [hereinafter “Snook et al.”].
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facilitating conviction but providing suboptimal deterrence against police
misconduct. As mentioned, legislators often follow public opinion in
enacting “tough on crime” legislation. But they can also be sensitive to
the effect of intrusive state powers on innocent, “ordinary” citizens. So
when they do act to regulate the investigative process, either on their
own initiative or in response to court decisions, they often clearly delimit
police power and provide meaningful sanctions for overreaching.44
Recognizing the benefits of having both institutions participate in
shaping the law of detention and search, many jurists have thus called on
courts to refuse to recognize common law police powers — thus spurring
Parliament to act.45 This is possible because, prima facie, people have
constitutional rights to not be detained or searched. At a minimum, any
intrusion constituting a “search or seizure” under section 8 of the
Charter46 or a “detention” under section 947 must be authorized by statute
or common law. So, if the courts refuse to recognize common law
powers permitting such intrusions, police may not commit them without
legislative sanction.
Unfortunately, this strategy is unlikely to work for police questioning. As mentioned, there is no statutory or constitutional right to not be
questioned by police. In theory, the courts could erect common law or
constitutional rules that would demand a legislative response. They could
amend the confessions rule, for example, to exclude all admissions to
persons in authority regardless of voluntariness, signalling to Parliament
that it must regulate interrogation. Or in the absence of statutory rules
regarding the invocation or waiver of the right to counsel, they could
issue a prophylactic rule under section 10(b) of the Charter requiring a
lawyer’s presence for questioning.48 But such innovations would represent dramatic departures from existing law as well as from deeply rooted
conventions regarding the respective functions of courts and legislatures.
Declining to recognize a common law police power, in contrast, is
44

See Kerr, “Fourth Amendment”, supra, note 39, at 839-58; Steven Penney, “Reasonable
Expectations of Privacy and Novel Search Technologies: An Economic Approach” (2007) J. Crim.
L. & Criminology 477, at 503-505; Craig Lerner, “Legislators as the ‘American Criminal Class’:
Why Congress (Sometimes) Protects the Rights of Defendants” (2004) U. Ill. L. Rev. 599, at 613-18;
Stribopoulos, “In Search of Dialogue, id., at 63-70.
45
See works cited, supra, note 3.
46
See Hunter v. Southam (sub nom. Canada (Combines Investigation Acts, Director of
Investigation and Research) v. Southam Inc.), [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, at 159
(S.C.C.); R. v. Dyment, [1988] S.C.J. No. 82, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 417, at 426 (S.C.C.).
47
See R. v. Grant, [2009] S.C.J. No. 32, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 353, at para. 54 (S.C.C.).
48
See, generally, Michael Plaxton, “In Search of Prophylactic Rules” (2005) 50 McGill L.J.
127 [hereinafter “Plaxton”].
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consistent with the courts’ accepted role in protecting constitutional
liberties, leaving Parliament room to authorize reasonable invasions of
those liberties. Nor is it likely that Parliament will choose of its own
accord to regulate in the field. It has had well over a century to do so, and
apart from the specialized realm of young persons, it has not done so.49
What is possible, however, is that if courts adopt the more boldly
regulatory approach to questioning that I urge below, Parliament might
be impelled to regulate in a way that accords better with its own policy
preferences. In this way, a productive dialogic relationship between
courts and the legislature could yet emerge, maximizing the advantages
and minimizing the disadvantages of each institution’s rule-making
process.50 But even if this does not occur, the law of police questioning
would still benefit from the courts’ attempts to compensate for legislative
silence.

IV. HOW COURTS CAN COMPENSATE FOR LEGISLATIVE SILENCE
To illustrate what a more boldly regulatory approach to police questioning might look like, I will survey some of the key rules deriving from
the common law confessions rule and section 10(b) of the Charter. In
relation to each of these rules, the Supreme Court of Canada has adopted
a largely adjudicative approach; that is, it has set out broad standards
enabling trial courts to make fine-grained, fact-based, ex post decisions
achieving a just result in the cases before them. I argue that the chief
goals of police questioning law — maximizing the availability of reliable
evidence of guilt and minimizing wrongful convictions based on false
confessions — would be better served by adopting a legislatively
inspired, regulatory approach; that is, the setting out of bright-line, ex
ante rules grounded on empirical evidence. My aim is not to propose a
comprehensive set of optimal rules, but rather to provide examples of
how appellate judges could better approach the rule-making task.
Before examining the jurisprudence, I should address two preliminary objections. The first relates to institutional competency. After
highlighting the deficiencies of judicial rule-making, it might seem
strange that I am calling for judges to adopt a role that they may not be
well suited for. Could an assertive, reformist approach by the courts in
49
For an explanation for why legislatures are often reluctant to legislate in criminal law, see
Dan M. Kahan, “Is Chevron Relevant to Criminal Law?” (1996) 110 Harv. L. Rev. 469, at 474-75.
50
See Stribopoulos, “Limits”, supra, note 3, at 318-23.
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this field make the situation worse, rather than better?51 There are several
responses to this charge. The first is to recognize that judicial regulation
is a second-best alternative. Since Parliament has been unwilling to act,
legal reform can only come from the courts. Second, as mentioned and as
described more fully below, Parliament retains a considerable capacity to
correct what it sees as judicial errors, should it choose to do so. And
third, in the realm of police questioning, there is reason to think that
courts are capable of mitigating their rule-making weaknesses. As
discussed below, courts can and have drawn from empirical literature on
interrogation and false confessions. This scholarship bears the features of
mature and reliable science52 and coheres to a significant extent with
long-standing judicial experience.53 And to the extent that empirical gaps
frustrate optimal rule-making, they are no more likely to be filled by
legislative inquiry than litigation.54
The second objection relates to the style of rule-making in question.
There is a long-standing debate in legal theory on whether it is better for
courts to articulate bright-line rules or flexible standards.55 Undoubtedly
the law requires both; the optimal mix turns on the context.56 Rules are
typically preferable to standards when judges have access to good
information about the context of the decision, the regulated domain
requires certainty, and the proposed rules can provide that certainty.57 As
mentioned immediately above, courts have access to good information
about false confessions, and there are several features of police questioning law that strongly militate in favour of certainty over flexibility.
The first, which I discuss in greater detail below, is that courts frequently err in assessing the reliability of confession evidence. Flexible,
case-by-case determinations of the admissibility or weight of such
evidence are likely to too often result in wrongful convictions.
Second, errors prompted by the rigidity of bright-line rules are less
likely to do harm in the context of police questioning than in other fields.
51

See, generally, Sunstein & Vermeule, supra, note 39.
See Moore & Fitzsimmons, supra, note 7, at 521.
53
See R. v. Oickle, [2000] S.C.J. No. 38, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 3, at para. 47 (S.C.C.).
54
These gaps include reliable estimates of the frequency of wrongful convictions based on
false confessions and the importance of confession evidence to conviction rates. See Sherrin, supra,
note 7, at 606-17; Saul M. Kassin et al., “Police-Induced Confessions: Risk Factors and Recommendations” (2010) 34 Law and Human Behavior 3, at 5 [hereinafter “Kassin et al.”].
55
See Louis Kaplow, “Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Approach” (1992) 42 Duke
L.J. 557.
56
See Cass R. Sunstein, One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism on the Supreme Court
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1999), at 57-60.
57
Id., at 57.
52
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If the application of a rule in a given case turns out to be too protective of
a criminal suspect ex post (i.e., by denying police use of a method that
might have induced a reliable confession), the loss to society’s interest in
convicting the guilty may not be great. The weight of empirical evidence
suggests that prophylactic exclusionary rules rarely cause wrongful
acquittals.58 And as mentioned below, jurisdictions that have forgone
problematic interrogation practices have experienced no reduction in
confession rates.
Lastly, case-by-case standards may be retained to prevent wrongful
conviction in cases where bright-line rules could not prevent the admission of a dubiously reliable confession. There is considerable evidence,
for example, that “vulnerable” individuals (including people who are
young, intellectually disabled, mentally ill or have especially compliant
personalities) may sometimes confess falsely, even in non-coercive
circumstances.59 Courts could develop bright-line rules requiring police
to identify and redress these vulnerabilities,60 but in some cases, the
extent of vulnerability might not be apparent ex ante. But if vulnerability is established at trial and exposes a significant risk of wrongful
conviction, courts sensitive to the phenomenon can still exclude the
confession.61

V. THE CONFESSIONS RULE
The confessions rule is a common law rule of evidence prohibiting
the admission at trial of statements made by suspects to police or other
“persons in authority” unless prosecutors prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the statements were made “voluntarily”.62 In theory, developing the rule in a regulatory vein should not be especially controversial. If
Parliament disliked the courts’ reforms, it could overrule them.
58
See Stephen J. Schulhofer, “Miranda’s Practical Effect: Substantial Benefits and Vanishingly Small Social Costs” (1996) 90 Nw. U.L. Rev. 500; John J. Donahue III, “Did Miranda
Diminish Police Effectiveness?” (1998) 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1147. For a contrary view, see Paul G.
Cassell & Richard Fowles, “Handcuffing the Cops? A Thirty-Year Perspective on Miranda’s
Harmful Effects on Law Enforcement” (1998) 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1055.
59
See Sherrin, supra, note 7, at 629-52; Richard A. Leo, “False Confessions: Causes, Consequences and Implications” (2009) 37 J. Am. Academy Psych. & Law 332, at 335-37; Kassin et al.,
supra, note 54, at 19-22.
60
See, e.g., Kassin et al., id. at 30-31.
61
See R. v. Oickle, supra, note 53, at para. 42; Sherrin, supra, note 7; Dale E. Ives, “Preventing False Confessions: Is Oickle Up to the Task?” (2007) 44 San Diego L. Rev. 477, at 480-84
[hereinafter “Ives”].
62
See R. v. Oickle, supra, note 53, at para. 24.
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It is true that the Supreme Court has recognized a “right to silence”
under section 7 of the Charter that overlaps with the confessions rule,63
but the implications of this holding are quite limited. For statements
made to police interrogators, the Court has held, the confessions rule
“effectively subsumes the constitutional right to silence”.64 Though
informed by the Charter, the framework for deciding voluntariness is
consequently still part of the common law.65 As the Court put it in R. v.
Oickle, in developing the common law rule, courts can “offer protections
beyond those guaranteed by the Charter”.66 While the courts would likely
balk at any legislative attempt to either permit the admission of involuntary confessions or dramatically re-conceive the concept of voluntariness
(to the accused’s detriment), Parliament would therefore have considerable space to regulate interrogation and dictate the conditions for the
admission of confessions.67
The problem, however, is that the courts have been reluctant to conceive of the confessions rule as serving a regulatory function.68 As
mentioned, it is technically a rule of evidence, not criminal procedure. It
does not, therefore, directly regulate the conduct of police in questioning
suspects. Any such effect is indirect, signalling to police that if they elicit
an involuntary statement, it will be inadmissible at trial.
The confessions rule has thus typically been articulated and applied
malleably to achieve justice ex post, rather than regulate questioning in
the public interest ex ante.69 This has been true even when courts have
been most attuned to both the policy issues underlying interrogation and
the social science available to inform that policy.

63

See R. v. Turcotte, supra, note 4, at para. 41; R. v. Singh, supra, note 4, at paras. 34-40; R.
v. G. (B.), [1999] S.C.J. No. 29, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 475, at paras. 22, 44 (S.C.C.); R. v. Whittle, [1994]
S.C.J. No. 69, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 914, at 931 (S.C.C.). See also Hamish Stewart, “The Confessions
Rule and the Charter” (2009) 54 McGill L.J. 517, at 529-34; Plaxton, supra, note 48, at para. 33;
Lisa Dufraimont, “The Common Law Confessions Rule in the Charter Era: Current Law and Future
Directions” (2008) 40 S.C.L.R. (2d) 249, at 255-56 [hereinafter “Dufraimont”].
64
R. v. Singh, id., at paras. 37-39. See also R. v. Oickle, supra, note 53, at paras. 29-31.
65
See R. v. Oickle, id., at para. 31.
66
Id., at para. 31. See also Hon. Justice Gary T. Trotter, “The Limits of Police Interrogation: The Limits of the Charter” (2008) 40 S.C.L.R. (2d) 293, at 302-306 [hereinafter “Trotter”].
67
See Plaxton, supra, note 48, at 143-44.
68
See, e.g., Trotter, supra, note 66, at 305 (expressing the judicial sentiment that it is “unrealistic to expect bright lines in this area”).
69
See Dufraimont, supra, note 63, at 259-60; Don Stuart, “Oickle: The Supreme Court’s
Recipe for Coercive Interrogation” (2000) 36 C.R. (5th) 188, at 188-91.
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Oickle illustrates the point. There, the Court took it upon itself to
modernize and rationalize the confessions rule.70 It invoked the prevention of wrongful convictions as the rule’s primary justification, referred
to the role of false confessions in convicting the innocent, summarized
the literature on the social and psychological dynamics of false confessions, and suggested how the various aspects of the rule should account
for those dynamics.71
There is a strong argument, however, that the Court’s adjudicative
approach fails to protect adequately against wrongful convictions. There
are two steps to this argument. First, without clear, prophylactic rules to
follow, interrogators will generate a significant number of false confessions. And second, because police, prosecutors and judges are likely to
overestimate their ability to distinguish between true and false confessions, a significant number of false confessions will be admitted into
evidence and contribute to wrongful convictions.
To decide whether a statement was made voluntarily, judges must
consider many factors, of which few are decisive. The voluntariness
inquiry is “contextual”,72 having regard to “the entire circumstances”,73
including the (objective) nature of the tactics used by police and the
suspect’s (subjective) reaction to those tactics.74 If police are uncertain
as to whether certain methods are permitted, they are less likely to act
with restraint.75 Faced with a recalcitrant suspect and a serious crime,
they may push the envelope, hoping that a court will later decide that,
considering all the circumstances, the confession is sufficiently reliable.
Consider the category of “threats or promises”. We know that the
use or threat of physical violence76 and concrete offers of lenient treat-

70
R. v. Oickle, supra, note 53, at para. 32. See also Edmund Thomas, “Lowering the Standard: R. v. Oickle and the Confessions Rule in Canada” (2005) 10 Can. Crim. L. Rev. 69 [hereinafter
“Thomas”].
71
R. v. Oickle, id., at paras. 34-45.
72
Id., at para. 71.
73
Id., at para. 68.
74
See R. v. Hodgson, [1998] S.C.J. No. 66, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 449, at para. 15 (S.C.C.); R. v.
Fitton, [1956] S.C.J. No. 70, [1956] S.C.R. 958, at 962 (S.C.C.); R. v. Spencer, [2007] S.C.J. No. 11,
[2007] 1 S.C.R. 500, at paras. 13, 21 (S.C.C.); R. v. Oickle, id., at para. 42.
75
See, generally, Jerome H. Skolnick, Justice Without Trial: Law Enforcement in Democratic Society (New York: MacMillan, 1994), at 12.
76
R. v. Oickle, supra, note 53, at para. 48 (“obviously imminent threats of torture will render a confession inadmissible”). Not surprisingly, the empirical record confirms that violence and
threats of violence are apt to produce false confessions. See Wayne T. Westling, “Something is
Rotten in the Interrogation Room: Let’s Try Video Oversight” (2001) 34 J. Marshall L. Rev. 537, at
543.
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ment77 will always result in exclusion. Few other techniques, however,
are prohibited outright. Courts have admitted confessions despite the use
of a variety of manipulative inducements, including offering psychiatric
counselling;78 threatening to investigate, question or charge suspects’
loved ones;79 withholding contact with loved ones;80 minimizing the
moral (as opposed to legal) seriousness of the offence;81 and suggesting
that “it would be better” if the suspect confessed.82
In Oickle, the Court intimated that quid pro quo inducements should
usually result in exclusion.83 It later held in R. v. Spencer,84 however, that
“while a quid pro quo is an important factor in establishing the existence
of a threat or promise, it is the strength of the inducement, having regard
to the particular individual and his or her circumstances, that is to be
considered in the overall contextual analysis”.85 Police clearly offered
Spencer a quid pro quo (withholding a visit with his girlfriend until he
confessed), but considering his savvy and experience in dealing with
police, the Court upheld the trial judge’s decision that his confession was
voluntary.86
The category of “oppression” is also fraught with indeterminacy. In
Oickle, the Court noted that such conditions may be created by depriving
suspects of necessities such as food, clothing, water, sleep or medical
attention; denying them access to counsel; subjecting them to aggressive,
intimidating or prolonged questioning; or confronting them with inadmissible or fabricated evidence.87 Failing to warn suspects about their
77
See R. v. Oickle, id., at para. 49. See also R. v. T. (S.G.), [2008] S.J. No. 572, 2008 SKCA
119 (Sask. C.A.), revd [2010] S.C.J. No. 20, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 688 (S.C.C.) (statement ruled
involuntary after police told accused that he might not be charged if he apologized).
78
R. v. Oickle, id., at paras. 50, 78 (suggestions that the suspect needed “professional help”
were acceptable because they did not constitute an offer contingent on a confession).
79
See R. v. Oickle, id., at paras. 81-84 (threat to question fiancée); R. v. Spencer, supra,
note 74 (threat to charge girlfriend).
80
R. v. Spencer, id.
81
R. v. Oickle, supra, note 53, at paras. 73-77.
82
The Supreme Court has stated that such comments require exclusion “only where the
circumstances reveal an implicit threat or promise”; otherwise they will likely be considered only
“moral inducements” that do not undermine voluntariness: R. v. Oickle, id., at paras. 55, 79-80. See
also R. v. Mujku, [2011] O.J. No. 284, 2011 ONCA 64, at paras. 33-35 (Ont. C.A.).
83
R. v. Oickle, id., at para. 57 (“The most important consideration in all cases is to look for
a quid pro quo offer by interrogators, regardless of whether it comes in the form of a threat or a
promise.”).
84
Supra, note 74.
85
Id., at para. 15 (emphasis added). See also R. v. Jackson, [1977] B.C.J. No. 1117, 34
C.C.C. (2d) 35, at 38 (B.C.C.A.).
86
R. v. Spencer, id., at paras. 13, 20-21.
87
Id., at paras. 60-61.
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right to silence and ignoring invocations of this right may also contribute
to an oppressive atmosphere.88
However, none of these factors is determinative and the case law reveals little consistency. Courts have found confessions to be voluntary,
for example, despite substantial sleep89 and clothing deprivations;90
lengthy and repetitive questioning;91 repeated denials of suspects’ desire
to remain silent;92 unlawful or unreasonably lengthy detentions;93 or
confronting suspects with false evidence of their guilt.94
Since Oickle, empirical evidence has continued to mount that many
of these tactics (including many used in the “Reid Technique” used by
most Canadian interrogators95) are apt to produce false confessions.96
Detailed and comprehensive accounts of the relationship between
common interrogation practices and false confessions may be found
88

R. v. Singh, supra, note 4, at paras. 32, 53. See also R. v. Otis, [2000] J.Q. no 4320, 151
C.C.C. (3d) 416, at para. 56 (Que. C.A.), leave to appeal refused [2000] C.S.C.R. no 640, [2001] 1
S.C.R. xvii (S.C.C.).
89
See, e.g., R. v. Ross, [1997] O.J. No. 2316, 30 O.T.C. 247 (Ont. Gen. Div.) (oppression
did not arise from the police’s refusal to allow an exhausted accused sleep during questioning).
90
See, e.g., R. v. Jackson, [2005] A.J. No. 1726, 2005 ABCA 430 (Alta. C.A.). But see R. v.
Moore-McFarlane, [2001] O.J. No. 4646, 56 O.R. (3d) 737, at para. 73 (Ont. C.A.) (lack of clothing
one of several factors raising doubt as to voluntariness).
91
See, e.g., R. v. Singh, supra, note 4, at para. 47.
92
See, e.g., R. v. Singh, id. (repeated questioning in face of 18 assertions of right to silence
did not render confession involuntary); R. v. Edmondson, [2005] S.J. No. 256, 2005 SKCA 51 (Sask.
C.A.), leave to appeal refused [2005] S.C.C.A. No. 273 (S.C.C.).
93
See, e.g., R. v. Roy, [2003] O.J. No. 4252, 15 C.R. (6th) 282, at para. 13 (Ont. C.A.).
94
See, e.g., R. v. Sinclair, [2003] B.C.J. No. 3258, 2003 BCSC 2040, at para. 136
(B.C.S.C.), affd [2010] S.C.J. No. 35, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 310 (S.C.C.) (finding confession voluntary
despite substantial “exaggerations” and “misinformation” about forensic and other evidence).
95
The Reid Technique is a proprietary interviewing method marketed by firm John E. Reid
and Associates. See Fred E. Inbau et al., Criminal Interrogation and Confessions, 4th ed. (Boston:
Jones and Bartlett, 2004). On the use of the Reid Technique by Canadian police see: Moore &
Fitzsimmons, supra, note 7, at 534-36; Snook et al., supra, note 43, at 217-19. For judicial
commentary, see: R. v. Cruz, [2008] A.J. No. 559, 2008 ABPC 155, at para. 106 (Alta. Prov. Ct.); R.
v. Minde, [2003] A.J. No. 1184, at para. 32, 343 A.R. 371 (Alta. Q.B.); R. v. Barrett, [1993] O.J. No.
1317, 13 O.R. (3d) 587, at para. 58 (Ont. C.A.), revd [1995] S.C.J. No. 19, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 752
(S.C.C.); R. v. Whalen, [1999] O.J. No. 3488, at paras. 11-15 (Ont. C.J.); R. v. Barges, [2005] O.J.
No. 5595, [2005] O.T.C. 1116, at paras. 52-53, 80-81 (Ont. S.C.J.); R. v. S. (M.J.), [2000] A.J. No.
391, 32 C.R. (5th) 378, at paras. 18-24, 38-50 (Alta. Prov. Ct.); R. v. Chapple, 2012 ABPC 229, at
paras. 61-73 (Alta. Prov. Ct.).
96
See Kassin et al., supra, note 54; Steve Drizin & Richard A. Leo, “The Problem of False
Confessions in the Post-DNA World” (2004) 82 N.C.L. Rev. 891 [hereinafter “Drizin & Leo”]; Saul
M. Kassin & Gisli H. Gudjonsson, “The Psychology of Confessions: A Review of the Literature and
Issues” (2004) 5 Psychol. Sci. in Pub. Int. 33, at 55 [hereinafter “Kassin & Gudjonsson”]; Richard J.
Ofshe & Richard A. Leo, “The Decision to Confess Falsely: Rational Choice and Irrational Action”
(1997) 74 Den. U.L. Rev. 979, at 1084-88 [hereinafter “Ofshe & Leo”]; Melissa B. Russano et al.,
“Investigating True and False Confessions within a Novel Experimental Paradigm” (2005) 16
Psychological Science 481, at 484.
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elsewhere.97 It will suffice here to highlight three tactics that have
frequently been found to be associated with false confessions.
The first is the presentation of false evidence, a tactic used in a high
proportion of documented false confession cases.98 Decades of psychological research has demonstrated that misinformation can powerfully
alter people’s perceptions and beliefs, and many experiments have shown
that participants presented with false evidence are more likely to falsely
confess than those who have not.99 As the Court noted in Oickle, such
evidence “is often crucial in convincing the suspect that protestations of
innocence, even if true, are futile”.100 Yet the Court declined to prohibit
the practice, and in subsequent cases courts have found confessions to be
voluntary even where police confronted the suspect with utterly fabricated evidence.101
The second tactic is the use of inducements to confess, including
suggestions that a confession will confer leniency or another tangible
benefit.102 As mentioned, tangible offers of leniency will likely render a
confession involuntary, but more subtle (or in the case of Spencer, notso-subtle) inducements are often permitted. The evidence suggests,
however, that statements suggesting leniency by “pragmatic implication”
are capable of inducing false confessions.103
A third practice commonly associated with false confessions is prolonged and persistent interrogation.104 Psychological studies indicate that
suspects subjected to such questioning may confess falsely in order to
end the ordeal,105 especially when deprived of sleep.106 In Oickle, the
Court acknowledged that false confessions can be produced by pro97
See, e.g., Kassin & Gudjonsson, id.; Drizin & Leo, id.; Sherrin, supra, note 7; Brandon L.
Garrett, “The Substance of False Confessions” (2010) 62 Stan. L. Rev. 1051 [hereinafter “Garrett”].
98
See Kassin et al., supra, note 54, at 28; see Garrett, id., at 1097-99.
99
See Robert Horselenberg, Harald Merckelback & Sarah Josephs, “Individual Differences
and False Confessions: A Conceptual Replication of Kassin and Kiechel (1996)” (2003) 9
Psychology, Crime & Law 1; Saul M. Kassin & Katherine L. Kiechel, “The Social Psychology of
False Confessions: Compliance, Internalization and Confabulation” (1996) 7 Psychological Science
125; Kassin et al., id., at 28-29. Exaggerating the strength of the evidence, especially that derived
from supposedly “scientific” methods like polygraphy, may also be problematic. See Thomas, supra,
note 70.
100
R. v. Oickle, supra, note 53, at para. 61. See also paras. 38, 40.
101
See, e.g., R. v. Sinclair, supra, note 94, at para. 136.
102
Kassin et al., supra, note 54, at 30.
103
Id.
104
See Drizin & Leo, supra, note 96, at 948-49; Garrett, supra, note 97, at 1096.
105
Kassin & Gudjonsson, supra, note 96, at 53-54; Drizin & Leo, id., at 948-49; Saul M.
Kassin, “On the Psychology of Confessions: Does Innocence Put Innocents at Risk?” (2005) 60
American Psychologist 215, at 221 [hereinafter “Kassin”]; Ofshe & Leo, supra, note 96, at 1061.
106
See Sherrin, supra, note 7, at 640-43.
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longed questioning.107 But it set no ex ante limit on the length of an
interrogation, stating only that lengthy questioning was one factor
capable of producing an atmosphere of oppression leading to an involuntary statement. Indeed, the interrogation approved in that case lasted
nearly six hours.
The evidence is strong, then, that despite the possibility of exclusion
under the confessions rule, police continue to question suspects in ways
apt to produce false confessions. This is in itself a significant concern,
since people who confess falsely face a high probability of wrongful
arrest, wrongful detention and wrongful prosecution. Even worse, of
course, is the prospect of wrongful conviction. To avoid this, courts must
have the capacity to discern and disregard false confessions. The option
of leaving the weight of dubiously reliable confessions to be decided by
the trier of fact is exceptionally dangerous. Courts have long recognized
that triers of fact have great difficulty discounting the weight of confessions, even those obtained in circumstances casting obvious doubt on
their reliability.108 The modern empirical record amply supports this
belief.109
The main safeguard against false confession-based wrongful convictions is therefore evidentiary exclusion, chiefly through the confessions
rule. That rule can only be effective in preventing wrongful convictions,
however, if there is a reliable record of all the circumstances relevant to
the interrogation. Historically, the ability of courts to assess the reliability
of confessions was greatly hampered by the evidentiary record. The
testimony of defendants and police often diverged, with such “swearing
contests” typically being won by police.110 Highly coercive interrogation
practices consequently often went undetected.
Today, many interrogations are electronically recorded, often with
both video and audio.111 As the Court noted in Oickle, this is a laudable
107

R. v. Oickle, supra, note 53, at paras. 45, 60.
See R. v. Oickle, id., at paras. 35-36; R. v. Osmar, [2007] O.J. No. 244, at para. 69, 2007
ONCA 50 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal refused [2007] S.C.C.A. No. 157 (S.C.C.); Wigmore on
Evidence (J. Chadbourn rev.), vol. 3 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970), at 303.
109
See Richard A. Leo, Police Interrogation and American Justice (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 2008), at 195-98, 246-68; Kassin, supra, note 105, at 222-23; G. Daniel Lassiter &
Andrew L. Geers, “Bias and Accuracy in the Evaluation of Confession Evidence” [hereinafter
“Lassiter & Geers”] in G. Daniel Lassiter, ed., Interrogations, Confessions, and Entrapment (New
York: Kluwer, 2004) 197, at 198-200.
110
See Ratushny, supra, note 4, at 107-108; Fred Kaufman, Admissibility of Confessions, 3d
ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1979), at 63-64, 140-42; Yale Kamisar, “Foreword: Brewer v. Williams — A
Hard Look at a Discomfiting Record” (1977) 66 Geo. L.J. 209.
111
See R. v. Oickle, supra, note 53, at para. 46.
108
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development.112 However, the Court refused to make electronic recording
a prerequisite (where feasible) for admissibility.113 This is unfortunate. As
so many commentators have argued, mandatory audio-visual recording
(of both interrogators and suspects) is a critical prophylactic against
wrongful convictions and carries few (if any) downsides.114 An increasing number of legislatures115 and courts116 have adopted some form of
mandatory recording rule. Canadian courts should do the same.117
112

Id.
Id.
See Kassin et al., supra, note 54, at 25-27; See Richard A. Leo et al., “Bringing Reliability Back In: False Confessions and Legal Safeguards in the Twenty-First Century” (2006) Wis. L.
Rev. 479, at 523 [hereinafter “Leo et al.”]; Steven A. Drizin & Beth A. Colgan, “Let the Cameras
Roll: Mandatory Videotaping of Interrogations Is the Solution to Illinois’ Problem of False
Confessions” (2001) 32 Loy. U. Chicago L.J. 337, at 339-41; Ratushny, supra, note 4, at 272; Law
Reform Commission of Canada, Questioning Suspects: Working Paper No. 32 (Ottawa: Law Reform
Commission of Canada, 1984), at 58; Alan Grant, “Videotaping Police Interviews: A Canadian
Experiment” (1987) Crim. L. Rev. 375; Alan Young, “Adversarial Justice and the Charter of Rights:
Stunting the Growth of the ‘Living Tree’” (1997) 39 Crim. L.Q. 362, at 379-80; Kent Roach,
“Unreliable Evidence and Wrongful Convictions: The Case for Excluding Tainted Identification
Evidence and Jailhouse and Coerced Confessions” (2007) 52 Crim. L.Q. 210, at 231-32; Joyce
Miller, The Audio-Visual Taping of Police Interviews with Suspects and Accused Persons by Halton
Regional Police Force: An Evaluation (Ottawa: Law Reform Commission of Canada, 1988); Report
to the Attorney General by the Police Commission on the Use of Video Equipment by Police Forces
in British Columbia (Victoria: British Columbia Police Commission, 1986); Tim Quigley, “Pre-trial,
Trial, and Post-trial Procedure” in Don Stuart, Ronald J. Delisle & Alan Manson, eds., Towards a
Clear and Just Criminal Law: A Criminal Reports Forum (Toronto: Carswell, 1999) 253, at 290;
Glanville Williams, “The Authentication of Statements to the Police” (1979) Crim. L.R. 6, at 13-22;
Welsh S. White, “False Confessions and the Constitution: Safeguards Against Untrustworthy
Confessions” (1997) 32 Harv. C.R.-C.L.L. Rev. 105, at 153; The Hon. Peter deC. Cory, The Inquiry
regarding Thomas Sophonow (November 4, 2001), at 19, online: <http://www.gov.mb.ca/justice/
publications/sophonow/police/recommend.html>; The Commission on Proceedings Involving Guy Paul
Morin (Toronto: Ministry of the Attorney General, 1998), at 1199-1206; Penney, “What’s Wrong?”,
supra, note 7, at 290-93; Penney, Rondinelli & Stribopoulos, supra, note 2, at paras. 4.39-4.41.
115
See Illinois Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963, 725 ILCS 5, § 103-2.1; Texas Code of
Criminal Procedure, art. 38.22 § 3(a)(1) (2002) (Texas); D.C. Code Ann., § 5-116.01 (LexisNexis
Supp. 2007) (D.C.); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 25, § 2803-B (2007) (Maine); N.M. Stat., § 29-1-16
(Supp. 2006) (New Mexico); N.C. Gen. Stat., § 15A-211 (North Carolina); Md. Code Ann., Crim.
Proc., § 2-402 (2009) (Maryland); Wis. Stat. Ann., §§ 968.073, 972.115 (West 2009) (Wisconsin);
H.B. 534 Mont. Code Ann., § 46-4 (2009) (Montana); Or. Rev. Stat., § 165.540 (2009) (Oregon);
Ind. R. Evid. 617 (Indiana); Evidence Act 2001 (Tas.), s. 85A; Crimes Act 1958 (Vict.), s. 464H;
Criminal Code (W.A.), s. 570D; Police Administration Act, ss. 142-143; Criminal Procedure Act
1986, s. 281 (N.S.W.); Summary Offences Act 1953, s. 74D (S.A.); Crimes Act 1914 (Cth.),
s. 23A(6); Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld.), ss. 246, 263-266; Crimes Act 1914
(Cth.), s. 23V; Criminal Justice Act, 1984 (Electronic Recording of Interviews) Regulations, 1997,
S.I. No. 74/1997 (Ireland); Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (U.K.), c. 62, s. 60.
116
See Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156, at 1159-60 (Alaska Sup. Ct. 1985); State v. Scales,
518 N.W.2d 587, at 591-93 (Minn. Sup. Ct. 1994).
117
Some courts, in Canada and the United States, have imposed rules that have stopped short
of requiring recording but provided police with strong incentives to do so. See, e.g., R. v. MooreMcFarlane, [2001] O.J. No. 4646, 160 C.C.C. (3d) 493, at para. 65 (Ont. C.A.) (failure to record will
place a “heavy burden” on the Crown to prove voluntariness); Commonwealth v. DiGiambattista,
113
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But having access to an accurate record of the interrogation is no
panacea. Psychologists have long known that ordinary people overestimate their capacity to detect deception.118 More recently, researchers
have shown that justice system professionals display similar overconfidence and have great difficulty discerning true from false confessions.119 There is little reason to think that judges are immune from this
deficiency.
Further, a high proportion of documented false confessions have included details that prosecutors have convincingly argued that an innocent
person could not have known.120 Interrogators may (often unintentionally) feed or leak non-public details to suspects, and evidence of such
contamination may either not appear or be ignored at trial, especially if
the entire course of the interrogation is not recorded.121 The apparent
truthfulness of such confessions may lead judges to admit (and triers of
fact to believe) them despite the presence of factors associated with false
confessions.122
For all of these reasons, any regulatory regime relying primarily on
ex post review is unlikely to mitigate the risk of wrongful conviction to
an acceptable level. How then would a regulatory approach improve this
situation? First and foremost, it would provide greater clarity to police on
what they are allowed and not allowed to do in questioning suspects.
Great strides have been made in recent years in determining the causes of
false confessions and identifying the circumstances in which they are apt
to lead to wrongful convictions. There is still uncertainty as to the
frequency of false confession-based wrongful convictions, and debate
over how far the law should go to prevent them.123 But armed with better
813 N.E.2d 516, at 535 (Mass. 2004) (instructing the jury that they may consider a confession less
reliable if unrecorded).
118
See B.M. DePaulo et al., “Cues to Deception” (2003) 129 Psychological Bulletin 74;
Lassiter & Geers, supra, note 109. See also, generally, Aldert Vrij, Detecting Lies and Deceit:
Pitfalls and Opportunities (Chichester: Wiley, 2008).
119
See Saul M. Kassin, Christian A. Meissner & Rebecca J. Norwick, “I’d Know a False
Confession if I Saw One” (2005) 29 Law and Human Behavior 211; Christian A. Meissner & Saul
M. Kassin, “‘He’s Guilty!’: Investigator Bias in Judgments of Truth and Deception” (2002) 26 Law
and Human Behavior 469; Kassin et al., supra, note 54, at 24-25; Kassin, supra, note 105, at 222-23.
See also, generally, Pär Anders Granhag & Leif A. Strömwall, eds., The Detection of Deception in
Forensic Contexts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
120
See Garrett, supra, note 97, at 1066 (36 of 38 cases studied).
121
Id., at 1066-83, 1113-15.
122
Id., at 1094-1102.
123
See, generally, Michel St-Yves, “Police Interrogation in Canada: From the Quest for
Confession to the Search for the Truth” in Tom Williamson, Becky Milne & Stephen P. Savage,
eds., International Developments in Investigative Interviewing (Cullumpton: Willan, 2009) 92; The
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insights as to the psycho-social causes of the phenomenon and the
limitations of the confessions rule in addressing it, courts should be able
to craft rules that would diminish the risk of wrongful conviction without
substantially compromising the state’s ability to convict the guilty. The
guiding principle should be to prohibit, or at least severely restrict, the
use of tactics that experience and science have shown are apt to produce
false confessions, not merely to exclude only confessions that appear to
be unreliable in a given case.124 This approach avoids the pitfalls of
biased ex post review referred to above.
The aim of this paper is to encourage courts to develop a regulatory
approach to interrogation law, not to propose a comprehensive set of
reforms to the confessions rule to minimize false confessions.125 But
potential reforms could include (in addition to an audio-visual recording
requirement) imposing maximum limits on the duration126 and minimum
standards on the conditions127 of interrogations; restricting the questioning of vulnerable suspects;128 banning the use of false evidence;129 and
prohibiting specific types misrepresentations as to the strength of
evidence.130 The Supreme Court of Canada should also consider reversing Spencer131 and forbid all inducements to confess, regardless of the
perceived capacity of suspects to resist such inducements.132 Empirical

Right Honourable Antonio Lamer, The Lamer Commission of Inquiry Pertaining to the Cases of:
Ronald Dalton, Gregory Parsons, Randy Druken (St. John’s: Office of the Queen’s Printer, 2006);
Working Group on the Prevention of Miscarriages of Justice of the Federal–Provincial–Territorial
Heads of Prosecutions Committee, Report on the Prevention of Miscarriages of Justice (Ottawa:
Department of Justice, 2004), Part 6.
124
See R. v. Oickle, supra, note 53, at para. 65.
125
For examples of the latter, see Leo et al., supra, note 114.
126
See Welsh S. White, “False Confessions and the Constitution: Safeguards Against Untrustworthy Confessions” (1997) 32 Harv. C.R.-C.L.L. Rev. 105 at 143-45 (suggesting a five-hour
time limit) [hereinafter “White”]; Kassin et al., supra, note 54, at 28.
127
See Ives, supra, note 61, at 498.
128
See, e.g., Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (U.K.), 1984, c. 60, Code C, Detention,
treatment and questioning of persons by police officers (in force January 31, 2008) (detailing special
procedures for questioning of mentally disordered and mentally vulnerable); Garrett, supra, note 97,
at 1116 (providing examples of legal and policy proposals).
129
See Kassin et al., supra, note 54, at 28-29; R. v. Mason, [1987] 3 All E.R. 481, at 484-85.
130
See White, supra, note 126, at 146-47; Ives, supra, note 61, at 498-99.
131
R. v. Spencer, supra, note 74.
132
See Lisa Dufraimont, “Regulating Unreliable Evidence: Can Evidence Rules Guide Juries and Prevent Wrongful Convictions?” (2008) 33 Queen’s L.J. 261, at 285-86; Dale E. Ives &
Christopher Sherrin, “R. v. Singh — A Meaningless Right to Silence with Dangerous Consequences”
(2007) 51 C.R. (6th) 250.
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research confirms what judges have long intuited: threats and promises
are the most frequent cause of false confessions.133
The proposals would inevitably generate controversy, especially
among police, prosecutors and others who would fear that police would
be handicapped in their ability to obtain reliable confessions necessary to
prove serious crimes. Experimental evidence134 and the experience of
other jurisdictions suggests,135 however, that less confrontational and
manipulative interrogation tactics are at least as adept at obtaining
reliable confessions as the harsher techniques more commonly used in
Canada and the United States.

VI. SECTION 10(b) OF THE CHARTER
In the United States, dissatisfaction with the confession rule’s effectiveness in curbing coercive interrogation practices led the Supreme
Court to adopt the Miranda warnings under the aegis of the Fifth
Amendment’s self-incrimination clause.136 Canada’s version of Miranda
is section 10(b) of the Charter, which states that “[e]veryone has the right
on arrest or detention ... to retain and instruct counsel without delay and
to be informed of that right”. In interpreting this simple directive, the
Supreme Court of Canada has issued an elaborate set of rules that is in
some ways a model of the kind of prospective regulatory regime proposed here. As detailed below, however, many of these rules are too
imprecise to provide substantial protection against false confessions.
Before elaborating this argument, I should address two potential objections. First, courts have not said that minimizing false confessions is
one of section 10(b)’s purposes. Instead, its purpose is to help suspects

133
See Richard Ofshe & Richard A. Leo, “The Social Psychology of Police Interrogation:
The Theory and Classification of True and False Confessions” (1997) 16 Studies in Law, Politics &
Society 189; Christopher Sherrin, “False Confessions and Admissions in Canadian Law” (2005) 30
Queen’s L.J. 601.
134
See Moore & Fitzsimmons, supra, note 7, at 537-40; Kassin et al., supra, note 54, at 29.
135
See S. Soukara et al., “A Study of What Really Happens in Police Interviews with Suspects” (2009) 15 Psychology, Crime & Law 493, at 502-503; Snook et al., supra, note 43, at 219-23;
Ivar A. Fahsing & Asbjørn Rachlew, “Investigative Interviewing in the Nordic Region” in Tom
Williamson, Becky Milne & Stephen P. Savage, eds., International Developments in Investigative
Interviewing (Cullumpton: Willan, 2009); Moore & Fitzsimmons, id., at 540-42; Stephen Moston et
al., “The Effects of Case Characteristics on Suspect Behaviour During Questioning” (1992) 32 Brit.
J. Criminology 23, at 38-39.
136
See Steven Penney, “Theories of Confession Admissibility: A Historical View” (1998)
25 Am. J. Crim. L. 309, at 366-72.
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make informed, voluntary choices in their interactions with police.137 The
right to counsel, the Supreme Court has held, gives suspects the opportunity to become more aware of their legal situation and mitigates the risk
of unwitting self-incrimination.138 However, in better equipping detainees
to resist pressure to confess, section 10(b) does indirectly help to minimize false confessions.139 As mentioned, questioning techniques apt to
produce false confessions are most likely to be used with detainees who
do not give police the answers they are looking for. Section 10(b) tells
such persons that they have the right to cut off questioning and talk to a
lawyer. It also reminds police that there are “moral and constitutional
limits” to their efforts to extract confessions.140 Even if section 10(b)
is not directly aimed at reducing false confessions, assessing whether
a regulatory approach can better enhance this goal is still a worthy
exercise.
The second objection relates to section 10(b)’s constitutional status.
In theory, it is much more difficult to amend rules promulgated by the
courts under the Charter than the common law. The difference may not
be as great in practice, however. As mentioned, the confessions rule has
been constitutionalized in the sense that courts would likely strike down
any statute diminishing its core protections. But consistent with the
Supreme Court’s dialogic approach to Charter review,141 legislation more
modestly modifying or augmenting the rule would likely be treated with
deference. A similar dynamic would likely emerge should Parliament
legislate on the right to counsel during interrogation. In recent years, the
Supreme Court of Canada has been willing to approve of substantial

137

See R. v. Bartle, [1994] S.C.J. No. 74, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 173, at 193-94 (S.C.C.); R. v.
Sinclair, [2010] S.C.J. No. 35, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 310, at paras. 24-26 (S.C.C.).
138
See R. v. Manninen, [1987] S.C.J. No. 41, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1233, at 1242-43 (S.C.C.); R.
v. Brydges, [1990] S.C.J. No. 8, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 190, at 203, 206, 215 (S.C.C.); R. v. Bartle, id., at
191; R. v. Prosper, [1994] S.C.J. No. 72, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 236, at 271 (S.C.C.); R. v. S. (R.J.), [1995]
S.C.J. No. 10, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 451, at para. 85 (S.C.C.); R. v. Jones, [1994] S.C.J. No. 42, [1994] 2
S.C.R. 229, at 254-55 (S.C.C.), per Lamer C.J.C., dissenting. See also R. v. Hebert, [1990] S.C.J.
No. 64, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 151, at 176 (S.C.C.).
139
See Christine Boyle, “R. v. Sinclair: A Relatively Disappointing Decision on the Right to
Counsel” (2010) 77 C.R. (6th) 310.
140
Richard A. Leo, “The Impact of Miranda Revisited” (1996) 86 J. Crim. L. & Criminology
621, at 679.
141
See Peter W. Hogg, Allison A. Bushell Tornton & Wade K. Wright, “Charter Dialogue
Revisited — Or ‘Much Ado About Metaphors’” (2007) 45 Osgoode Hall L.J. 1; Michael Plaxton,
supra, note 48.
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legislative modifications of rules that it had previously promulgated as
constitutional minimum standards.142
In much of its early section 10(b) jurisprudence, the Supreme Court
did impose several bright-line obligations and prohibitions on police. In
concert with the Court’s now-abandoned, near-automatic exclusionary
rule for self-incriminating evidence,143 these rules set the framework for
a robust regulatory approach to the right to counsel. Recall that the only
express obligation on police contained in section 10(b) is to tell detainees
that they have a right to talk to a lawyer. But under the Court’s “purposive” interpretive approach, police must also inform detainees of any
available legal aid or duty counsel services.144 Further, if duty counsel is
available, police must tell detainees how to contact them.145 And when
detainees do assert their right to counsel, police must allow them, as soon
as feasibly possible,146 to telephone a lawyer in private.147 Police may not
elicit any evidence from the detainee before such access is provided.148
But many other section 10(b) rules hew more closely to the adjudicative approach. Particularly opaque is the threshold determination of
whether a person has been detained and is therefore entitled to the right
to counsel. The governing test in most interrogation cases is whether the
“reasonable person in the individual’s circumstances would conclude that
he or she had been deprived by the state of the liberty of choice”,
considering the “circumstances giving rise to the encounter as would
142
See, e.g., R. v. Mills, [1999] S.C.J. No. 68, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668 (S.C.C.); R. v. Hall,
[2002] S.C.J. No. 65, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 309 (S.C.C.); R. v. Darrach, [2000] S.C.J. 46, [2000] 2 S.C.R.
443 (S.C.C.); Canada (Attorney General) v. JTI-Macdonald Corp., [2007] S.C.J. 30, [2007] 2 S.C.R.
610 (S.C.C.).
143
See R. v. Stillman, supra, note 22 (now overtaken on this point by R. v. Grant, supra,
note 47).
144
R. v. Brydges, supra, note 138, at 209-10, 212, 215; R. v. Bartle, supra, note 137, at 195.
145
See R. v. Bartle, id., at 197. Typically, police give detainees either a single (toll-free) duty
counsel telephone number or a list of numbers for lawyers acting as duty counsel. See R. v. Bartle,
id., at 200-201; R. v. Cook, [1998] S.C.J. No. 68, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 597, at para. 59 (S.C.C.); R. v.
Pozniak, [1994] S.C.J. No. 75, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 310, at para. 11 (S.C.C.); R. v. Harper, [1994] S.C.J.
No. 71, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 343, at para. 26 (S.C.C.); R. v. Cobham, [1994] S.C.J. No. 76, [1994] 3
S.C.R. 360, at para. 12 (S.C.C.).
146
See R. v. Manninen, supra, note 138, at 1242 (S.C.C.) (“there may be circumstances in
which it is particularly urgent that the police continue with an investigation before it is possible to
facilitate a detainee’s communication with counsel”). See also R. v. Burley, [2004] O.J. No. 319, 181
C.C.C. (3d) 463, at para. 16 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Nelson, [2010] A.J. No. 1329, 490 A.R. 271, at paras.
15-23 (Alta. C.A.).
147
The courts have typically held that s. 10(b) requires an environment “where the conversation cannot be overheard and there is no reasonable apprehension ... of being overheard”. R. v.
Miller, [1990] N.J. No. 305, 87 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 55, at 58 (Nfld. C.A.).
148
R. v. Lewis, [2007] N.S.J. No. 18, 2007 NSCA 2, at para. 32 (N.S.C.A.); R. v. Nelson,
supra, note 146.
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reasonably be perceived by the individual”, “[t]he nature of the police
conduct”, the “particular characteristics or circumstances of the individual”, as well as a non-exhaustive list of considerations falling within
these categories.149
There are many problems with this test.150 I focus here on those relating to false confessions. The Court in Grant likely intended that potentially coercive, interrogation-style questioning trigger the protection of
section 10(b). Several of the Grant factors, including whether police
have singled out the suspect for “focussed investigation”, the “duration
of the encounter” and the “language used” by police, seem directed to
this end.151 Yet no factor is decisive, and even intensive interrogation
may not always trigger detention if police tell suspects that they are free
to leave. The Court in Grant stated that in “those situations where the
police may be uncertain whether their conduct is having a coercive effect
on the individual, it is open to them to inform the subject in unambiguous
terms that he or she is under no obligation to answer questions and is free
to go”.152 Before Grant, most courts had found detention when police
had identified the accused as the likely perpetrator and conducted
questioning with a view to inducing self-incriminating statements, even
when suspects were told that they were free to leave or to decline
answering questions.153 But since Grant, some have held otherwise.154
Given the psychological dynamics of intensive interrogation, even
repeated references to the freedom to leave may not be heeded, especially by innocent suspects eager to clear their names.155 A simpler rule
finding detention whenever police try to elicit self-incriminating infor149

R. v. Grant, supra, note 47, at para. 44.
See Steven Penney & James Stribopoulos, “‘Detention’ under the Charter after R. v.
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(2008) 40 S.C.L.R. 271, at 281-85 [hereinafter “Penney, ‘Triggering the Right’”].
151
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v. Teske, [2005] O.J. No. 3759, at para. 55, 32 C.R. (6th) 103 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Rajaratnam, [2006]
A.J. No. 1373, 214 C.C.C. (3d) 547, at para. 17 (Alta. C.A.); R. v. Lee, [2007] A.J. No. 1183, 417
A.R. 331 (Alta. C.A.).
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See, e.g., R. v. Rodh, [2010] S.J. No. 647, 2010 SKPC 150, at para. 25 (Sask Prov. Ct.);
R. v. Wheeler, [2010] Y.J. No. 10, 2010 YKTC 7, at para. 28 (Y.T. Terr. Ct.). See also R. v. Way,
supra, note 151, at paras. 39-40 (“there may be situations where the police advise a person that he or
she is under no obligation to answer questions and is free to go, which would still result in a finding
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when such information has been genuinely provided”).
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mation from someone they have identified as a likely perpetrator of the
offence would provide clearer guidance to police and better mitigate the
risk of false confession.156
Another minefield of indeterminacy is the jurisprudence surrounding
the duration and circumstances of the “reasonable opportunity” afforded
to detainees who have invoked their right to counsel.157 For the duration
of this period, police must refrain from questioning or otherwise attempting to elicit self-incriminating evidence from detainees.158 Once the
“reasonable opportunity” expires, however, police may proceed with such
measures, regardless of whether detainees have talked to a lawyer.159
Most of the litigation in this area arises when a detainee expresses a
desire to talk to a specific lawyer, is not able to contact him or her, and is
then questioned. Sometimes detainees will not have spoken to any
lawyer; in others they may have consulted with either duty counsel or
another lawyer. The Supreme Court has held that detainees have a
presumptive right to talk to a lawyer of their choosing, but must be
reasonably diligent in doing so.160 The cases on this issue are notoriously
inconsistent.161 As one would expect of the adjudicative approach, there
are few hard and fast rules: in each case, “all of the surrounding circumstances” must be considered in deciding whether police have provided a
reasonable opportunity; or conversely, whether detainees have diligently
exercised their rights.162
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A related rule requires police to issue an additional caution (often
called a “Prosper warning”) to detainees who, after invoking their right
to talk to a lawyer, decide not to do so.163 In such cases, police must defer
questioning until detainees clearly and knowingly waive their right to
counsel. This requires police to remind detainees that they are entitled to
a reasonable opportunity to contact counsel, during which the police are
prohibited from obtaining incriminating evidence.164 This rule is clear
enough, but several courts have found that the warning need not be given
to detainees who have not been reasonably diligent in attempting to
contact counsel.165 It thus requires police to again decide, on the totality
of circumstances, whether the detainee has been duly diligent.
A regulatory perspective points to a much narrower construal of the
right to counsel of choice. In most cases, detainees will be able to speak
to duty counsel immediately. Where such consultation is available,
detainees who express a desire to talk to a specific lawyer should be
given a brief and definite period of time to do so (e.g., one hour). If
detainees have not talked to this lawyer within that period, they should
be given the chance to speak with duty counsel. If they decline that
opportunity, police should be obliged to issue the Prosper warning before
questioning them. If neither preferred nor duty counsel is available,
police will have to hold off until one of them is, unless detainees give a
valid Prosper waiver.
This approach would be simple for police to administer and would
have the happy effects of increasing the availability of reliable confession evidence (leading to just convictions), minimizing the frequency of
false confessions (leading to wrongful convictions), and in some cases,
shortening the duration of detention.
The goal of obtaining just convictions would be fostered in two
ways. First, it would assist the police in conducting timely and efficient
investigations. The due diligence rule’s purpose is to prevent dilatory

163

R. v. Prosper, supra, note 138.
R. v. Prosper, id., at 274-75. See also R. v. Ross, supra, note 160, at 11-12; R. v. Manninen, supra, note 138, at 1244; R. v. Black, [1989] S.C.J. No. 81, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 138, at 156-57
(S.C.C.); R. v. Brydges, supra, note 138, at 204; R. v. Evans, [1991] S.C.J. No. 31, [1991] 1 S.C.R.
869, at 893-94 (S.C.C.); R. v. Smith, [1991] S.C.J. No. 24, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 714, at 727-28 (S.C.C.);
R. v. Bartle, supra, note 137, at 192-94, 206.
165
See R. v. Basko, supra, note 162; R. v. Jones, [2005] A.J. No. 1325, 2005 ABCA 289
(Alta. C.A.), leave to appeal refused [2005] S.C.C.A. No. 538 (S.C.C.); R. v. Luong, [2000] A.J. No.
1310, 149 C.C.C. (3d) 571 (Alta. C.A.).
164

290

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2012), 57 S.C.L.R. (2d)

detainees from frustrating police efforts to obtain reliable evidence.166
Where duty counsel is available, shortening the “reasonable opportunity”
period to one hour (or another brief period) would further enhance this
purpose. In some cases, this would generate reliable evidence that would
not have otherwise been obtainable.
Second, under the current rule, the uncertainty of the due diligence
standard will often cause inadvertent Charter violations. Courts will find
that police should have either given detainees more time to contact their
lawyers or given them a Prosper warning. In many of these cases,
reliable confession evidence will be excluded as a result. This would be
an acceptable cost if exclusion were necessary to encourage compliance
with a rule protecting against wrongful convictions. But as explained
immediately below, the current expansive interpretation of the right to
counsel of choice does not advance these interests.
Indeed, the approach I propose is more likely to prevent false confessions than the current one. Under the reasonable opportunity rule,
detainees who wish to talk to counsel but are not duly diligent are
entitled to neither consultation nor a Prosper warning. Having indicated
a reluctance to talk to police without legal advice, they are nonetheless
subjected to the rigours of interrogation without the benefit of that
advice. If talking to a lawyer helps the innocent to resist pressure to
confess, that assistance is lost. My proposal, in contrast, would ensure
that all detainees who want to talk to a lawyer actually do so, unless they
later exercise a voluntary and informed waiver.
In at least some cases, this approach would also lessen the duration
of detainees’ detentions. Because the “reasonable opportunity” period
would be short, police could proceed with interrogation sooner than is
the case today. This would spur earlier release if, after the interrogation,
police decide to: decline to arrest a detainee; release an arrestee; or
promptly present an arrestee to a justice for potential pre-trial release.
It might be argued that an even better approach would be to allow
detainees more time to talk to lawyers of their choosing. In my view, this
would frustrate the efficiency of interrogation and prolong detention
without significantly minimizing the risk of false confession. While the
advice given to detainees may vary, there is no evidence that duty
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counsel’s advice is less protective than that of other lawyers.167 Lawyers
acting as duty counsel are ethically obliged to provide competent and
comprehensive advice, and organizations that deliver duty counsel
services bear a responsibility to ensure proper training, supervision and
oversight. In any case, since under the current regime most detainees
who invoke their rights to talk to duty counsel, preserving a robust right
to counsel of choice would add little protection against false confessions.
No doubt, some detainees feel more comfortable consulting lawyers
whom they know. If they are able to talk to them within a brief and
certain period of time, they should be permitted to do so. But in the
absence of evidence that trust or confidence in a particular lawyer
mitigates the risk of false confessions, we would be better off with a
regime that ensures both prompt consultation and prompt interrogation.
There is, however, an alternative that would be even simpler to administer and offer even more protection against false confessions: a rule
prohibiting incommunicado questioning after the assertion of the right to
counsel. In the United States under Miranda, once detainees invoke their
right to counsel, police must cease questioning until a lawyer is present.168 This rule applies regardless of whether detainees have talked to a
lawyer or attempted (whether diligently or not) to do so.169
The advantages of this approach are obvious. Talking to a lawyer
does not guarantee that detainees will be able to resist pressure to confess
falsely.170 As the United States Supreme Court has observed, the prohibition on post-invocation questioning is “designed to prevent police from
badgering a defendant into waiving his previously asserted Miranda
rights”.171 For detainees who invoke their rights (admittedly a minority of
all detainees), such a rule would dramatically diminish the risk of false
confession. But it would also come with a cost: reducing the availability
of reliable confession evidence. Whether the benefits would outweigh the
costs entails a difficult policy choice. In my view they would.172 But the
167
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Supreme Court of Canada’s recent decision in R. v. Sinclair173 has
foreclosed this option for the foreseeable future. There, the Court
confirmed that police could not only question after invocation (assuming
consultation, the expiry of the reasonable opportunity or a Prosper
waiver), but also that they could refuse detainees’ requests to either stop
the interrogation or (save for limited exceptions) consult again with
counsel.174 The best option for bolstering section 10(b)’s protection
against false confessions is thus to encourage prompt consultation with a
lawyer, even if that means curtailing the right to counsel of choice.

VII. CONCLUSION
Legislative inaction does not in itself give courts free rein to adopt
the kind of regulatory approach proposed here. In many situations, a
case-by-case incrementalist approach may still be best. But where a
pressing policy concern presents itself, clear and prospective rules are
needed to address that concern, and the courts have access to the empirical information required to shape those rules, the case for bright-line
prospective regulation becomes strong.
The law of police questioning meets each of these criteria. The prevention of wrongful convictions is one of the most important goals of the
criminal justice system.175 The evidence is mounting that false confessions are not rare and often contribute to wrongful convictions. The kinds
of clear rules necessary to substantially mitigate the problem are relatively easy to discern and amply supported by the empirical record. And
it is becoming increasingly apparent that the adoption of such rules is not
likely to substantially hamper efforts to convict the guilty.
Meaningful reform of police questioning will likely require more
than legal innovation. Professional norms will also need to change (there
are tentative signs that this may finally be starting to occur176). But the
law can play an important role in both regulating questioning practices
and fostering attitudinal changes among interrogators. In the absence of
legislative action, the responsibility falls on appellate judges to take up
this regulatory mantle.
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